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“You're unbelievably naïve,” said Ultron to Vision.2 
“Well, I was born yesterday,” responded Vision.3 
 
Intended as a snarky comeback, Vision’s response in the movie Avengers: Age of Ultron 
highlights a fundamental difference between artificial intelligence (“AI”) processing and the 
functioning of the human mind. As Ultron aptly put it (irony aside), AI are simply naïve. Despite 
the trend of anthropomorphizing AI in science fiction, modern AI remain fundamentally different 
from human beings. 
AI technologies emerged in the early 1950s, and Alan Turing asked his famous question, 
“Can machines think?”4 Only a few years later, in 1956, a presentation at the Dartmouth Summer 
Research Project on Artificial Intelligence (“DSRPAI”) coined the term “artificial intelligence” 
and introduced what is considered to be one of the first AI programs.5 The first successful AI 
program was likely either Arthur Samuel’s checkers-playing program6 or Allen Newell, Herbert 
Simon, and Cliff Shaw’s automated reasoning program, called Logic Theorist.7  
Initially, development of AI was restricted by computer storage limitations, and AI 
development stagnated for a period of decades.8 Then, in the 1980s, new algorithmic techniques 
                                                 
2 AVENGERS: AGE OF ULTRON (Marvel Studios & Walt Disney Pictures 2015). 
3 Id. 
4 A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433, 433 (1950). Turing proposed the “imitation 
game” in his paper contemplating whether or not machines could think.  
5 Rockwell Anyoha, The History of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. U. SITN BLOG: SPECIAL EDITION ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 28, 2017), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/. 
6 See Arthur L. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3 IBM J. OF RES. & DEV. 
210 (1959). 
7 See Leo Gugerty, Newell and Simon’s Logic Theorist: Historical Background and Impact on Cognitive Modeling, 
50 PROC. OF THE HUM. FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOC’Y ANN. MEETING 880 (2006). 
8 See Anyoha, supra note 5. 
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sparked a resurgence in AI.9 Among these techniques were “deep learning” and “expert 
systems.”10 In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue defeated world champion Garry Kasparov in a chess 
match11—an enormous leap from the very first chess-playing AI only fifty years earlier. Recent 
rapid growth in both computer processing power and data storage and acquisition has led to the 
current AI boom of the Digital Age.12 
AI have become ubiquitous in many industries. We encounter numerous implementations 
of AI in our daily lives—from friendly, voice-activated personal assistants like Siri and Alexa, to 
Facebook’s powerful facial recognition and targeted advertisements.13 AI is also used widely in 
the technology, banking, and marketing industries.14 These AI are exceptionally useful for the 
limited tasks that they are programmed to accomplish. 
For example, Facebook has used an AI tool called DeepFace to learn to recognize people 
in photos that users upload.15 Facebook claimed the application’s most advanced image 
recognition tool was as successful as humans, or even slightly more so, at recognizing the same 
people in different images.16 Another potentially more troubling example comes from the French 
company, Cloem, which has developed algorithms based on patent law best practices and brute 
force techniques to compile patent claim permutations generated from a set of keywords and a 
                                                 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 William Saletan, Chess Bump: The Triumphant Teamwork of Humans and Computers, SLATE (May 11, 2007), 
https://slate.com/technology/2007/05/the-triumphant-teamwork-of-humans-and-computers.html. 
12 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO TECHNOLOGY TRENDS: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
(2019). 
13 See Karen Hao, What is Machine Learning?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/11/17/103781/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-you-another-flowchart/. 
14 See Anyoha, supra note 5. 
15 Yaniv Taigman, Ming Yang, & Marc’ Aurelio Ranzato, DEEPFACE: CLOSING THE GAP TO HUMAN-LEVEL 
PERFORMANCE IN FACE VERIFICATION (2014). 
16 See id. 
4https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss2/2
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seed patent claim by altering the word-choice and making other grammatical variations.17 Even 
more recently, IBM’s “Miss Debater” AI debated live against debate champion Harish Natarajan.18 
Miss Debater crafted its case on the topic of subsidizing preschools by scanning billions of existing 
sentences from a document library and strategically aggregating the sentences into a surprisingly 
coherent argument.19 
At the structural level, modern AI techniques are generally focused within the subset of 
machine learning algorithms, including neural networks and deep learning.20 Machine learning 
algorithms discern patterns from data, and deep learning techniques amplify this effect by utilizing 
multiple layers of computational nodes to sift through data and find patterns.21 Machine learning 
techniques can be further categorized into three subcategories: supervised learning, unsupervised 
learning, and reinforcement learning, with supervised learning being the most prevalent 
technique.22 Another system of classifying AI that is used more generally by those in technological 
fields refers to Artificial Narrow Intelligence (“ANI”), Artificial General Intelligence (“AGI”), 
and Artificial Superintelligence (“ASI”).23 All existing AI currently fall into the category of ANI—
no existing AI (not even the most complex deep learning algorithm) is capable of learning, 
perceiving, understanding, and functioning on the level of humans.24 
                                                 
17 CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/technology/ (last visited April 16, 2020). The beta system touts that users can 
“play with infinity in a few steps.” 
18 Sigal Samuel, An AI System Competed Against a Human Debate Champion. Here’s What Happened. Here’s what 
happened, VOX (Feb. 12, 2019) https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/12/18222392/artificial-intelligence-
debate-ibm-san-francisco. 
19 See id. 
20 See Hao, supra note 13. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 Naveen Joshi, 7 Types of Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/06/19/7-types-of-artificial-intelligence/#5660adfa233e. 
24 Id. 
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The increasing prevalence of AI in so many industries raises real concerns about the legal 
implications of AI. Intellectual property law, and particularly patent law, is one field in which 
these concerns have been raised. In fact, AI is already a familiar topic to many patent attorneys, 
and the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) estimated that nearly 340,000 AI-
related patent applications have been filed as of 2019.25 Coinciding with the increasing prevalence 
of AI, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) also recently published a request 
for comments on the intersection between intellectual property rights and AI.26  
On April 27, 2020 the UPSTO published a long-awaited decision declining to extend patent 
inventorship to an AI, based on the statutory plain meaning and case law defining the requirements 
for proper inventorship.27 Prior to the April USPTO decision, one commentator criticized that the 
U.S. had not yet addressed the question of whether or not AI could be recognized as an inventor 
on a patent, despite the likely use of AI in the development of numerous currently granted 
patents.28 Given the likelihood that AI were already widely used in the development of patented 
inventions, the validity of AI inventorship was a question that desperately needed resolution, and 
the USPTO got it exactly right in answering with a resounding “no.” 
The act of invention under U.S. patent law has traditionally required both “conception” and 
“reduction to practice” as a means of identifying the proper inventor of the patented invention.29 
As AI become more powerful, it is unclear whether or not AI could eventually be deemed to have 
                                                 
25 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 12.  
26 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, PTO-C-2019-0029, Request for Comments of Patenting Artificial Intelligence 
Inventions (Aug. 27, 2019). 
27 U.S. Patent Application No. US16/524,350 (filed July 29, 2019) (Decision on Petition Apr. 27, 2020). 
28 Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1079, 1083 (2016) (“[M]achines have been autonomously generating patentable results for at least twenty years”). 
29 MPEP § 2138 (9th ed. 2018). 
6https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss2/2
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“conceived” of an inventive idea. However, our understanding of the functioning of the human 
brain has also changed significantly due to technological advances and has revealed stark 
differences between human and AI processing, so the legal definition of “conception” as it relates 
to patent inventorship should reflect that understanding. 
This paper argues that the “conception” element of patent inventorship is necessarily a 
human neurological process and it is vital to the functioning of the U.S. patent system because of 
the underlying policy of incentivizing inventiveness. Thus, AI processing, regardless of relative 
efficiency compared to humans, cannot amount to “conception,” as defined by U.S. patent law, so 
AI cannot and should not be recognized as inventors under U.S. patent law. As such, this paper 
provides a deeper rationale to support the USPTO decision denying inventorship recognition for 
an AI. This paper does not intend to determine whether or not AI could be granted legal 
personhood; decide if AI should have any other roles in the U.S. patent system; or elaborate on AI 
as patentable subject matter. These questions will require close analysis of the applicable sections 
of the U.S. patent laws and relevant case law, and, ultimately, it will likely fall to Congress to 
address whether or not AI will ever be recognized through legal personhood. Rather, this paper 
posits that the patent law requirement that an inventor must have conceived of the claimed subject 
matter in a patent application is connected to the incentivization scheme of the U.S. patent system 
and, therefore, inherently a human quality.  
This paper is divided into four parts. The introduction is Part I. Part II provides an overview 
of patent inventorship and the definition of “conception” as a requirement for inventorship. Part 
III illustrates the rationale for excluding AI from being recognized as inventors under the 
conception requirement with an example case, analogy to other limitations on intellectual property 
rights for non-human entities, and an overview of human cognitive neuroscience compared to the 
7Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
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characteristics of modern AI. Part III also recognizes problems that might arise under this analysis 
and provides a possible avenue for resolution. In conclusion, this paper summarizes the modern 
requirement of “conception” for proper inventorship as an inherently human mental activity, which 
excludes AI. 
 
II. PATENT INVENTORSHIP: WHO IS AN INVENTOR AND WHAT IS CONCEPTION? 
A. Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution 
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution (the “Intellectual Property Clause”) grants 
to Congress the enumerated power "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries."30 Thus, Congress has the sole discretion to create a patent system, and Congress 
has delegated the power to issue patents to the USPTO. However, it remains a constitutional 
requirement that the patent system is tied to inventors. Therefore, the terms used in the Intellectual 
Property Clause itself, including “inventor,” are subject to constitutional interpretation, and it is 
important to consider the original understanding of these terms in defining patent rights.  
 
B. Constitutional Definition of “Inventor” 
The Intellectual Property Clause is “unique in that it is the only one of the Enumerated 
Powers where the drafters mandated ‘a specific mode of accomplishing the particular authority 
granted,’” so the specific reference to “inventors” and their “discoveries” is significant.31 In an 
                                                 
30 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
31 Brief of Appellants at 46, MadStad Eng'g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(No. 2013-1511), 2013 WL 5536452 (quoting Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 149 (2005), aff'd, 466 F.3d 
1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
8https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss2/2
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effort to ascertain the meaning of constitutional terms, legal scholars have looked to contemporary 
sources, such as Samuel Johnson’s dictionary.32 There, “inventor” is defined as “[o]ne who 
produces something new; a deviser of something not known before.”33 Mirroring the verbs 
“devise” and “produce” in this definition indicates that the “produc[tion of] something new” must 
stem from the mind of the inventor, so an inventor is someone who thinks of and thereafter creates 
novel subject matter. This is the person whom Congress has the discretion to recognize with the 
patent exclusive rights.34 
 
C. A Patent Must List the Proper Inventor 
Under the U.S. patent laws, patent rights vest initially in the inventor.35 Specifically, § 101 
of the Patent Act states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor . . . .”36 The plain language of § 101, in accordance with the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution, makes it clear that only an inventor may obtain a patent; therefore, 
inventorship is inherently a condition for patentability.37  
                                                 
32 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785). 
33 Id. 
34 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The patent exclusive rights referred to in the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution are often shorthanded as a “monopoly.” 
35 Id. See, e.g., Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602 (1868) ("He is the inventor and is entitled to the 
patent who first brought the machine to perfection and made it capable of useful operation. . . . No one is entitled to 
a patent for that which he did not invent unless he can show a legal title to the same from the inventor or by 
operation of law . . . ."); 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824)( “[T]he right of the inventor [is] the fruit of his mind—it 
belongs to him more than any other property—he does not inherit it—he takes it by no man's gift—it peculiarly 
belongs to him, and he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of it.”). 
36 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
37 See id.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Prior to enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”)38, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(f) set forth an explicit inventorship requirement for priority in the “first-to-invent” patent 
system: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless he did not himself invent the subject matter 
sought to be patented.”39 Although this explicit inventorship requirement was eliminated with the 
AIA and the shift to a “first-inventor-to-file” system, a patent will still be determined to be invalid 
if an actual inventor is not named.40 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) 
published by the USPTO defines rejections based on both § 101 and § 115 for incorrect 
inventorship of applications filed on or after September 16, 2012.41 To date, neither the Supreme 
Court nor the Federal Circuit has addressed the constitutionality of the “first-inventor-to-file” 
system42, though one commentator suggests that the new rules for priority are not inconsistent with 
the framers’ views on the purpose of the U.S. patent system.43 Regardless of any decision on 
priority, it remains a constitutional requirement that patents are granted to inventors.44 
The proper inventor for a patent can either be a single human (sole inventorship) or multiple 
humans (joint inventorship).45 “Inventor” is defined as “the individual or, if a joint invention, the 
                                                 
38 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
39 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (amended 2011). 
40 See 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It is also notable that if inventorship were no 
longer important under the AIA, it would not have made sense to refer to the system as “first-inventor-to-file.” 
41 MPEP § 2137.01 (9th ed. 2018); id. at § 2157 (“Although the AIA eliminated pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(f), the 
patent laws still require the naming of the actual inventor or joint inventors of the claimed subject matter.”) 
42 See MadStad Eng'g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12-cv-1589-T-23MAP, 2013 WL 3155280 
(M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013), aff'd, 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 153 S.Ct. 1398 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2015) 
(No. 14-366) (affirming dismissal for lack of standing but declining to reach the question of constitutionality of the 
“first-inventor-to-file” system). 
43 See generally Alexander J. Kasner, The Original Meaning of Constitutional Inventors: Resolving the Unanswered 
Question of the Madstad Litigation, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2015). 
44 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
45 DONALD CHISUM, 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.04 (2020). 
10https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss2/2
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individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.”46 
Defining “an inventor” so broadly as “an individual” seems to leave open the question of whether 
or not AI could be an inventor. However, although many statutes define “person” to include 
abstract entities such as corporations and societies, in addition to individual people47, that is not 
the case with the term “individual” as used in the patent statutes because corporations cannot be 
inventors.48 Additionally, the act of invention for purposes of U.S. patent law has developed to 
require two related elements, conception and reduction to practice, the first of which excludes AI. 
 
D. Conception 
i. A Mental Act 
Conception is the mental formulation by the inventor of a complete inventive idea.49 
Donald Chisum describes that the modern concept of “conception” developed from two decisions 
by the Commissioner of Patents Leggett in 1871.50 In the first of these cases, Edison v. Foote & 
Randall, the Commissioner relied on the idea of conception to decide an interference over the 
invention of an adapted telegraph printing lever.51 There, Edison relied upon the date he 
successfully constructed the instrument as the date of invention, but Foote and Randall relied upon 
an earlier date corresponding to a sketch made by Foote, which experts testified they could have 
                                                 
46 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (2012). 
47 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“[T]he words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals . . . .”). 
48 See, e.g., MBO Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 602 F.3d 1306, 1310 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010); New 
Idea Farm. Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
49 CHISUM, supra note 45 at § 10.04. 
50 Id. at § 10.04(1)(a). 
51 Id. (citing Edison v. Foote, 1871 C.D. 80 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)). 
11Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
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translated into a working model.52 The Commissioner awarded priority to Foote and Randall and 
stated that “[i]nvention is not the work of the hands, but of the brain. The man that first conceived 
the complete idea by representing it on paper, or by clear and undisputed oral explanation, is the 
first inventor . . . .”53 Edison v. Foote & Randall therefore distinguished conception as a mental 
act, rather than a physical act. 
In Cameron & Everett v. Brick, the Commissioner further defined the mental act of 
conception between two extremes: construction of a working model and “the idea struck out—the 
brilliant thought obtained—the great improvement in embryo.”54 The Commissioner struck a 
balance between these extremes and defined conception as the point in time “when the ‘embryo’ 
has taken some definite form in mind and seeks deliverance, and when this is evidenced by such 
description or illustration as to demonstrate its completeness.”55 Though decided in the context of 
priority of invention, these early decisions by the Patent Office consistently recognized the mental 
element of conception as superior to the physical element of constructing the invention.56 
In Smith v. Nichols, the U.S. Supreme Court solidified the importance of conception over 
any physical act of creation.57 In the opinion, Justice Swayne declared that “A patentable invention 
is a mental result. It must be new and shown to be of practical utility. Everything within the domain 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (quoting Edison v. Foote, 1871 C.D. 80, 81 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)) (emphasis added). 
54 Id. (quoting Cameron v. Brick, 1871 C.D. 89, 90 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)). 
55 Id. (quoting Cameron v. Brick, 1871 C.D. 89, 90 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)) (emphasis added). 
56 See also Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1875) (“Mechanical skill is one thing: invention is a 
different thing. Perfection of workmanship, however much it may increase the convenience, extend the use, or 
diminish expense, is not patentable. The distinction between mechanical skill, with its conveniences and advantages 
and inventive genius, is recognized in all the cases.”). 
57 See Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112 (1874). 
12https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss2/2
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of the conception belongs to him who conceived it. The machine, process, or product is but its 
material reflex and embodiment.”58  
In 1897, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia decided the leading case 
Mergenthaler v. Scudder.59 There, Mergenthaler relied upon constructive reduction to practice at 
the time of filing his patent applications as the date of invention in an interference proceeding, and 
Scudder attempted to establish prior invention of the same linotype machine with earlier evidence 
of conception. The Mergenthaler court reversed in favor of Mergenthaler and refined the definition 
of conception in relation to completeness: 
The conception of the invention consists in the complete performance of the mental 
part of the inventive act. All that remains to be accomplished, in order to perfect 
the act or instrument, belongs to the department of construction, not invention. It is 
therefore the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent 
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in 
practice, that constitutes an available conception, within the meaning of the patent 
law.60 
 
The Mergenthaler definition of conception has been widely adopted by the courts, and the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used this definition of conception since its establishment in 
1982.61  
                                                 
58 Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
59 Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264 (D.C. Cir. 1897). 
60 Id. at 276 (citing W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 375 (1890)) (first emphasis 
added). 
61 CHISUM, supra note 45 at § 10.04(1)(c). See, e.g., Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir.1994) 
(“Conception is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordinary skill 
would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation.”); Hybritech 
Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.1986) (“Conception is ‘the formation in the 
mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to 
be applied in practice.’”) (first citing W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 532 (1890), 
then citing Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir.1985)).  
13Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
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Additionally, because the date of conception could dominate over the date of reduction to 
practice if the inventor continued to work with reasonable diligence after conception62, the mental 
act of conception is the most important characteristic of invention, not the physical act of reduction 
to practice. In fact, actual reduction to practice was never required for a valid patent application63, 
which leaves only the mental act of conception as an absolute requirement to define the inventive 
act. 
Although most cases on conception predate the AIA, and often concerned determining a 
precise date of invention, those cases remain important because they define the act of invention, 
which remains a constitutional requirement. By focusing on the act of conception, with reduction 
to practice being of secondary consideration, patent law has long highlighted the mental aspects 
of inventive activity.  
When these early cases were decided and conception was defined as a mental act, that 
mental act almost certainly only referred to human mental processes. It would not have been 
necessary at the time to define “mental act” any further because the idea of machines with human-
like intelligence was only barely conceivable, even in science fiction. The earliest example of AI 
in fiction may be Samuel Butler’s Erewhon, published in 1872, which explores Butler’s premise 
that machines might develop consciousness.64 However, this premise was presented in a satirical 
                                                 
62 Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 276 (“‘He who first conceives and gives expression to the idea of an invention in 
such clear and intelligible manner that a person skilled in the business could construct the thing, is entitled to a 
patent, provided he uses reasonable diligence in perfecting it.’”) (quoting McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. 
Minneapolis Harvester Works, 42 F. 152, 157 (C.C.D. Minn. 1890)). 
63 MPEP § 2138.05 (9th ed. 2018). Reduction to practice could be either actual or constructive, and the simple filing 
of the patent application was sufficient to establish both conception and constructive reduction to practice of the 
subject matter claimed in the application. Id. The inventor did not need to show evidence of actual reduction to 
practice when relying on the content of the patent application. Id. See also Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
64 SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON (1872). 
14https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss2/2
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view of Victorian society and certainly not widely viewed as realistic. AI was not technologically 
realized until the mid-twentieth century.65 
 
ii. Connecting Conception to Inventorship: Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. 
Despite its basis in cases related to priority of invention, the meaning of “conception” is 
also closely linked to other issues, including inventorship. Determining priority of invention based 
on the date of conception is the corollary of determining the proper inventor based on who 
conceived of the invention. Furthermore, conception is described as “the touchstone of 
inventorship.”66 
In the leading case Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
decided an issue of proper joint inventorship based on conception.67 There, Barr Laboratories 
(“Barr”) sought FDA approval to manufacture and market a generic version of the drug 3’-
azidothymidine (“AZT”) by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).68 Burroughs 
Wellcome (“Burroughs”) commenced a patent infringement suit against Barr after it was notified 
of the ANDA.69 Barr conceded that its AZT product would infringe Burroughs’ patents; however, 
Barr filed a counterclaim under 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1988) seeking to correct inventorship of 
Burroughs’ patents to add two NIH employees as coinventors—Barr had obtained a license to 
manufacture and sell AZT from the government, which would be the owner of the NIH 
                                                 
65 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 
66 Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the 
completion of the mental part of invention.”). 
67 See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
68 Id. at 1226. 
69 Id. 
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coinventors’ interests in Burroughs’ patents.70 Barr argued that the invention was not conceived 
in a sufficiently complete form until Burroughs received the results from tests conducted by the 
NIH.71 
A panel of the Federal Circuit held that the inventors listed by Burroughs successfully 
claimed conception prior to the purported NIH coinventors for five of Burroughs’ patents because 
their conception was corroborated by a draft patent application dated prior to any of the 
experiments conducted by the NIH.72 The panel clarified that “[The] document is not itself a 
conception, for conception occurs in the inventors' minds, not on paper. The draft simply 
corroborates the claim that they had formulated a definite and permanent idea of the inventions by 
the time it was prepared.”73 Furthermore, the purported NIH coinventors merely participated in 
the normal course of clinical trials for the drug.74 The panel held that the NIH employees were not 
joint inventors of Burroughs’ inventions.75 Thus, the Burroughs court looked to evidence of 
conception to determine whether or not individuals could be properly joined as coinventors, in 
addition to determining priority of invention. 
The Federal Circuit addressed conception in terms of patent inventorship again in 2003 in 
Board of Education v. American Bioscience, Inc.76 In the Board of Education v. American 
Bioscience, Inc. case, a panel of the Federal Circuit applied the definition of conception in the 
                                                 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 1227.  
72 Id. at 1230.  
73 Id. (emphasis added). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1231. 
76 333 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(considering circumstantial evidence of conception to determine if a scientist was a co-inventor); Nartron Corp. v. 
Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that an individual who explained the state of the art 
did not conceive of the invention and was not a co-inventor). 
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context of chemical inventions to determine whether or not an individual contributed to the 
conception of the patented compound and could be recognized as an inventor.77 The panel held 
that an individual could not be properly recognized as a joint inventor of a chemical compound 
simply for “having in mind specific portions of a claimed compound” rather than the final 
compound “with all its components.”78  
A proper inventor is the human who has conceived of the invention. Because of the 
significant connection between conception and inventorship79, conception case law will remain 
relevant for patent applications governed by the AIA “first-inventor-to-file” priority system.80 The 
Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the question of inventorship for a patent filed under the AIA, 
but because the proper inventor must still be listed on every patent application81, it is highly likely 
that proper inventorship (and joint inventorship) will still be determined based on conception.  
                                                 
77 See Bd. of Educ. v. Am. Bioscience, Inc., 333 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
78 Id. at 1340. 
79 The mental act requirement of conception was also tenuously associated with the “Flash of Genius” doctrine, 
which was applied by the Federal Circuit for over a decade until it was abolished in 1952. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(2012). This doctrine addressed the patentability of an invention and was formalized by the Supreme Court in 1941. 
See Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). In Cuno, the Supreme Court held that 
a patentable invention “must reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling.” Id. at 91. The 
Flash of Genius doctrine tied patentability to the specific nature of the patentee-inventor’s mental process. See, e.g., 
The “Flash of Genius” Standard of Patentable Invention, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 84, 87 (1944) (“the standard of 
patentable invention represented by [the Flash of Genius doctrine] is apparently based upon the nature of the mental 
processes of the patentee-inventor by which he achieved the advancement in the art claimed in his patent, rather than 
solely upon the objective nature of the advancement itself.”). Ultimately, the Flash of Genius doctrine proved to be a 
vague and unworkable standard and the doctrine was statutorily overruled by § 103 of the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 
103 (2012). See also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (“It also seems apparent that 
Congress intended by the last sentence of s 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court announced in the 
controversial phrase ‘flash of creative genius,’ used in Cuno Engineering . . . .”). One commentator argues that it 
logically follows from this legislative history that “patentability of computational inventions should be based on the 
inventiveness of a computer's output” rather than the requirement of any particular mental act. Abbott, supra note 28 
at 1111. This view, however, goes a significant step further than the abolishment of the Flash of Genius doctrine. 
The Flash of Genius doctrine may have been an unworkable test for connecting patentability of an invention to a 
specific mental process, but there is no evidence to suggest that the “mental act” aspect of conception generally was 
also unworkable or unnecessary. The courts continue to apply the requirement of “conception” in cases relating to 
priority and inventorship. 
80 See CHISUM, supra note 45 at § 10.04. 
81 See 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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This leaves the critical inquiry of whether or not AI can satisfy the conception requirement 
and be listed as inventors on patent applications. As the subsequent discussion will demonstrate, 
it is clear that AI cannot satisfy the conception requirement. 
 
iii. Policy of Incentivizing Inventors’ Ingenuity 
The policy considerations that are vital to the existence of the U.S. patent system serve as 
further evidence that conception is the critical element of the act of invention and, therefore, 
proper patent inventorship. The framers of the Constitution largely took the position that the 
patent system should function as an economic trade between inventors and the public.82 Thomas 
Jefferson is viewed as one of the foundational architects of the U.S. patent system, and he was of 
the opinion that “patents were meant as ‘encouragement to men to pursue ideas, which may 
produce utility.’”83 Moreover, numerous legal scholars have recognized this view of the policy 
underlying the U.S. patent system as more persuasive than other property rights justifications.84  
It is unlikely that AI could ever be incentivized in the way that human inventors are 
incentivized (e.g., monetarily or with industry recognition and stature) and issuing patents that 
are not incentive-driven could lead to vast over-privatization of inventions.85 More is certainly 
not always better, particularly when the means to achieving more is to flout decades of 
                                                 
82 See generally Kasner, supra note 43. 
83 Id. at 29 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)) (emphasis added). 
84 See e.g., Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu, When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: An 
Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 2217, 2239 (2018) (“To effectively incentivize 
innovations, patent law provides rewards, which should be high enough to promote innovation . . . .”). 
85 Numerous commentators have raised the concern that the U.S. patent system might already function to stifle 
rather than promote inventiveness because of the vast number of patents with uncertain enforceability. See, e.g., 
Oskar Liivak, Overclaiming Is Criminal, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1417, 1417 (2017) (citing Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. 
McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2285 (2016)). 
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inventorship precedent and sound policy. In the words of Thomas Jefferson himself, it is man’s 
“ideas” which are to be encouraged.86 As will be addressed in greater detail below, modern AI 
do not conceive of “ideas,” so to speak, and cannot be incentivized to conceive of ideas, thus, 
participation by AI in the U.S. patent system would not comport with the primary policy goals of 
the system itself. 
 
III. AI CANNOT SATISFY THE CONCEPTION REQUIREMENT OF PATENT INVENTORSHIP 
A. DABUS: An Example Case 
So far, there have not been many patents filed listing an AI inventor, but one highly 
publicized example provides an illustration of how the issue will be treated in both the United 
States and European patent systems. Dr. Stephen L. Thaler developed an AI called “Device for 
Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience” (“DABUS”) and filed patent applications on 
two inventions allegedly created autonomously by DABUS.87 The two patent applications, one for 
a fractal food container and one for an attention-attracting beacon (the “DABUS applications”), 
each listed DABUS as the sole inventor.88 Dr. Thaler included himself as the legal representative 
for DABUS and the assignee of the DABUS applications.89 The DABUS applications were filed 
with the USPTO and multiple international patent offices, including the European Patent Office 
(“EPO”) and the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (“UKIPO”).90 The USPTO as well 
                                                 
86 Kasner, supra note 43 at 29 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)). 
87 Austin J. Kim & Matthew Horton, USPTO Confirms Inventorship as Limited to Natural Human Beings, FOLEY & 
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as both the EPO and UKIPO all refused the DABUS applications on the grounds that an AI cannot 
be an inventor.91 
On April 27, 2020 the USPTO published its decision on the DABUS applications in 
response to a petition to vacate a Notice to File Missing Parts of Nonprovisional Application (the 
“Notice”).92 The issued Notice indicated that the DABUS applications did not identify the 
inventor.93 The USPTO denied the petition and refused to recognize DABUS as an inventor based 
on the plain language of the patent statutes and Federal Circuit “conception” precedent requiring 
a patent inventor be a natural person.94 
By late November of 2019, the EPO had similarly declined to extend inventorship to 
DABUS after oral proceedings for the European counterparts of the DABUS applications.95 There, 
the EPO denied inventorship recognition to DABUS by recognizing the European patent system’s 
scheme of moral rights of inventors and summarizing that the inventor designated on a patent 
application must be a human being, not a machine.96 The UKIPO took a very similar approach in 
its December 2019 decision.97 The moral rights scheme is somewhat different from some of the 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 U.S. Patent Application No. US16/524,350 (filed July 29, 2019) (Dec. Comm’r Pat. Apr. 27, 2020) (petition 
denied). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 5-7 (first citing Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 
F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013), then citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
1993)). The USPTO explained in its decision that “[w]hile these Federal Circuit decisions are in the context of states 
and corporations, respectively, the discussion of conception as being a ‘formation in the mind of the inventor’ and a 
‘mental act’ is equally applicable to machines and indicated that conception—the touchstone of inventorship—must 
be performed by a natural person.” Id. The USPTO also decided that none of the policy considerations raised by the 
petitioner outweighed the plain language of the statues as interpreted by the courts. Id. 
95 Eur. Patent Application No. EP18275163 (filed Oct. 17, 2018) (decision Jan. 27, 2020) (finalizing outcome of oral 
proceedings conducted on Nov. 25, 2019). 
96 Id. 




economically motivated policies that dictate recognition of inventors in the U.S. patent system; 
however, counsel for Dr. Thaler argued that AI would continue to invent even without 
incentivization.98 This logic sounds like an admission that “inventing” is an automatic, pre-
programmed process for DABUS—it does not sound like conceiving of an inventive idea. Despite 
Dr. Thaler’s optimistic view of DABUS, DABUS is still limited by the training inputs it receives 
and the underlying architecture of its software and hardware, just like any other AI.  
 
B. Analogous Limitations of IP Rights for Other Non-Human Entities 
i. Corporations Cannot Be Inventors 
As further evidence of the view that inventorship requires human conception, consider the 
jurisprudence on the issue of whether non-human entities can be inventors. For example, 
corporations are barred from being recognized as inventors on patent applications, and, instead, 
corporations participate in the patent system as assignees.99 Instead, corporations participate in the 
patent system as assignees.  
Part of the reasoning for excluding corporations from inventorship recognition is the idea 
that a corporation cannot conceive of an invention because a corporation has no collective 
consciousness to perform the required mental act. For example, in z4 Technologies, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., accused infringer Microsoft alleged, inter alia, in support of its defense of prior 
invention, that it “corporately both conceived and reduced to practice.”100 A panel of the Federal 
                                                 
98 Eur. Patent Application No. EP18275163, supra note 95 (counsel for Dr. Thaler argued in written submission in 
preparation to/during oral proceedings that “AI systems will continue to develop technology that is clever and will 
do so irrespective of whether or not Patent Offices decide to grant patents on the inventions they conceive.”).. 
99 See, e.g., MBO Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 602 F.3d 1306, 1309 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Individuals, not corporations, create inventions.”); New Idea Farm. Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 
1566 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[P]eople conceive, not companies . . . .”).  
100 z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 
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Circuit noted that “[t]he district court expressed reservations concerning the propriety of asserting 
corporate conception, but it expressly declined to decide this issue . . . . Because we agree that this 
instruction was not relevant, we need not and do not address the merits of Microsoft's claims 
regarding corporate conception.”101 As such, the Federal Circuit indicated in dicta a concern about 
recognizing non-human inventorship or inventorship arising from alternatives to conception in an 
individual human mind.102 
Further, the example of barring corporations illustrates a connection to the underlying 
social goals of the U.S. patent system. Commentators describe that initial patent rights vest in 
human inventors rather than abstract entities like corporations as a way of incentivizing human 
ingenuity separately and in exchange for the economic benefit of the invention.103  The link 
between conception and the economic reward of patenting is critical to the patentability inquiry. 
However, corporations have no ingenuity to incentivize. In the same manner, AI processing 
cannot be simply substituted for human ingenuity as doing so would break the connection 
between the initial node of ingenuity and the ultimate economic benefit that is conferred by the 
patent system. It is insufficient to argue that AI might be able to produce inventions entirely 
without incentivization because the U.S. patent system presumes that inventive ingenuity must 
be incentivized in order to occur.104 
 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id. See also Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that States also cannot be inventors because “[t]o perform [the required] mental act, 
inventors must be natural persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns. And because States cannot be inventors, 
it follows that inventorship is not a core sovereign interest of the States.”)  
103 See Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L. REV. 813, 858-
59 (2018). 
104 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.  
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ii. Animals as Other Non-Human Entities and Comparison to Copyright Law 
Further bolstering the foregoing analysis is how the U.S. Copyright Office treats non-
human authors. Though copyright law is distinct from patent law in many ways, each of these 
systems arises from the same clause of the Constitution105, and it can be useful to analogize 
between the two intellectual property systems at a broad level.  
Under U.S. copyright law, an author is the creator of a work of original expression.106 
Eligible works of authorship can include literary works, musical works, architectural works, and 
photographs, among others.107 In the notorious case, Naruto v. Slater, a six-year-old, “highly 
intelligent,” crested macaque named Naruto picked up David John Slater’s camera and took 
multiple “selfies.”108 The complaint in Naruto alleged that a book published containing the 
“selfies” violated Naruto’s copyright.109 The court disagreed and held that it would be an 
“extraordinary step” unsupported by the Copyright Act to extend copyright authorship to a non-
human.110  
The Naruto case indicates that the courts are leery of giving legal recognition to non-human 
forms of consciousness without explicit legislative intent. On the topic of other forms of 
consciousness, Charles Darwin described the difference between the minds of man and animals as 
“one of degree and not of kind.”111 In contrast, AI is different in both degree and kind: in degree, 
                                                 
105 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
106 See Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (“An author in that sense is he to 
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
107 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). See Burrows-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58. 
108 Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016), aff’d 
88 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at *8-10. 
111 1 CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 105 (1st ed. 1871). 
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the processing ability of AI may be greater than that of humans in limited situations, but, in kind, 
AI lacks grounding in common sense and thousands of years of evolution. The courts should follow 
Naruto and refrain from sneaking AI into the patent system under the standard of conception when 
the patent system has always presupposed that inventions develop from a human mental act. 
The U.S. Copyright Office has taken a comparatively more proactive stance on preventing 
the intrusion of AI into the protection for creative works. Well before the April 2020 USPTO 
decision to not recognize AI as inventors, copyright law expressly excluded automatically 
generated works that are produced without input from a human author.112 As such, the recent 
USPTO decision is consistent with copyright law in that it reasserts a bright-line rule barring non-
human inventorship. 
 
C. Scientific Perspectives 
i. Uniqueness of the Human Mind 
While neuroscience may generally be an unfamiliar topic in the courts, Justice Breyer has 
long advocated for legal decisions to be more rigorously informed by scientific developments 
because “[s]cientific issues permeate the law.”113 Cognitive neuroscience is notoriously one of the 
more opaque fields within the broad category of human biology, and we are far from having a 
complete understanding of the human brain, but modern neuroscience techniques still highlight 
                                                 
112 Lim, supra note 103 at 836-37 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed. 2017)) (“The U.S. Copyright Office . . . determined that it will register only those works 
‘created by a human being,’ while excluding ‘works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that 
operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author.’”). 
113 Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, 16 (4) ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2000), 
https://issues.org/breyer/. Justice Breyer eloquently pointed out in his article that “[a] judge is not a scientist, and a 
courtroom is not a scientific laboratory. But the law must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of 
scientifically sound knowledge.” Id. 
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just how truly unique the functioning of the human brain really is, particularly in comparison to 
AI. 
Human brains contain something on the order of 100 billion neurons—the cells that form 
the building blocks of the human nervous system. A biological neuron typically consists of a cell 
nucleus, which receives input from other neurons at input terminals called dendrites, and an axon 
which transmits chemical signals from the cell nucleus as outputs across synapses to other neurons. 
However, the range in brain sizes throughout the animal kingdom suggests that the uniqueness of 
the human brain is found in something more than just the sheer number of its component parts.114 
Despite a significant lack of clarity in the field of cognitive neuroscience, neuroimaging 
studies—particularly functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) techniques—have begun 
to uncover the neural processes that give rise to human creativity and innovation.115 A recent study 
used fMRI techniques to identify and model a brain network associated with human creative 
activities, which indicated that there may be a specific neuronal connectivity profile that 
characterizes human creativity.116  
One aspect of the human nervous system that is quite different from artificial neural 
networks is that our nervous system responds to both internal and external (to the body) stimuli.117 
Though artificial neural networks contain similar component parts to biological neurons, artificial 
                                                 
114 Alan Jasanoff, The cerebral mystique, AEON (May 8, 2018), https://aeon.co/essays/we-are-more-than-our-brains-
on-neuroscience-and-being-human. See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, FROM 
MOLECULES TO MINDS CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY WORKSHOP SUMMARY 11 (2008) (“[T]he brain is 
significantly more than the sum of its parts . . . .”). Contra Ravid, supra note 84 at 2225-29 (identifying eight crucial 
features of AI systems and suggesting that AI systems that include all of these features are comparable to humans). 
115 Roger E. Beaty et al., Robust prediction of individual creative ability from brain functional connectivity, 115 (5) 
PNAS 1087, 1087 (Jan. 30, 2018). fMRI techniques allow researchers to visualize and examine coordinated patterns 
of neural activity while humans perform particular tasks. 
116 Id. 
117 Jasanoff, supra note 114 (referring to reciprocal brain-body interaction pathways such as the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (“HPA”) axis and the physiological influence of intestinal microbes). 
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neural networks simply do not replicate this sort of dynamic complexity. In fact, due to their 
relative simplicity, artificial neural networks are typically used in neuroscientific research models 
to learn more about the human brain and its specific pathways but not to replicate it.118 
From an evolutionary perspective, it has been suggested that the uniqueness of human 
cognitive abilities emerged as a set of social skills under cooperative and prosocial evolutionary 
motivations.119 Phylogenetic comparisons to our closest biological relatives indicate that specific 
social pressures probably triggered the evolution of human cognition.120 Other species may have 
some similar cognitive traits, but human cognition on the whole is unparalleled.121  
Thus, faithfully replicating human cognition would likely require finding a means of 
accurately reproducing the social conditions under which our species evolved. Without this 
understanding, any artificial model of human cognition is just guessing and checking with little 
hope of actually replicating. The law should not tolerate the bald assertion that AI could potentially 
replicate human cognition because it is unsubstantiated by the weight of cognitive neuroscience 
and evolutionary anthropology. 
 
ii. Characteristics of Modern AI 
It is easy to think of AI as conscious beings, and the trend of anthropomorphizing AI in 
fiction has been around for over a century, but allowing those anthropomorphic characterizations 
to spill over into our understanding of modern AI technologies is misleading at best and generally 
                                                 
118 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, FROM MOLECULES TO MINDS CHALLENGES FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY WORKSHOP SUMMARY 11-13 (2008).  
119 Evan L. MacLean, Unraveling the evolution of uniquely human cognition, 113 (23) PNAS 6348, 6352 (June 7, 
2016). 
120 Id. at 6349-52 (comparing cognitive traits of bonobos and chimpanzees). 
121 Id. at 6352. 
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just incorrect. Somewhat unfortunately, this trend has only been exacerbated by the explosive 
popularity of “neural networks” as a machine learning technique. The name originated from the 
biological organization of neurons and synapses122, though no neural network is anywhere near a 
faithful replication of the human brain. Furthermore, because the neuroscience of human creativity 
is far from fully understood, it can be easy to assume that AI are more similar to humans than is 
true in reality. David Watson of the Alan Turing Institute opines that “[b]y anthropomorphizing a 
statistical model, we implicitly grant it a degree of agency that not only overstates its true abilities, 
but robs us of our own autonomy.”123  
Watson is particularly critical of neural networks for three main reasons: (1) they are easy 
to fool; (2) they are extremely data inefficient; and (3) they are “myopic” or, in other words, near-
sighted.124 These deficiencies are all noted with respect to human cognition. Artificial neural 
networks only “learn” by assessing an outcome and modifying the system’s “weights” so that the 
weights are gradually shifted in the direction that increases performance of the specified tasks.125 
Other experts hypothesized that “the alleged myopia problem is just a byproduct of the requirement 
that [neural networks] select a label from a constrained choice set.”126 But this illustrates exactly 
                                                 
122 See Elizabeth Fernandez, AI is Not Similar to Human Intelligence. Thinking So Could be Dangerous, FORBES 
(Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/fernandezelizabeth/2019/11/30/ai-is-not-similar-to-human-
intelligence-thinking-so-could-be-dangerous/#7295a6b46c22. 
123 David Watson, The Rhetoric and Reality of Anthropomorphism in Artificial Intelligence, 29 MINDS & MACHINES 
417, 434 (2019). 
124 See id. at 422-24. Watson suggests alternative algorithmic techniques may have other similarities to human 
cognitions, but he concludes that “the rhetoric of anthropomorphism can do more harm than good when it comes to 
conceptualizing the important ethical challenges posed by emerging [AI] technologies.” Id. at 418. 
125 Madeline Schiappa & Ethan Rudd, Man vs machine: comparing artificial and biological neural networks, 
SOPHOS NEWS (Sep. 21, 2017), https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2017/09/21/man-vs-machine-comparing-artificial-
and-biological-neural-networks/. 
126 Watson, supra note 123 at 424. 
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the reason that AI processing is not equivalent to human cognition. AI are limited by their inputs 
and the tasks they are programmed to accomplish.  
In other words, AI are constrained by the inputs from developers, or at least by the biases 
imparted by the developer into the code that constitutes the AI. Because of the inherent biases in 
AI code, the creation of AI is different from the genetic transmission of traits from one human to 
her offspring—it is not a wholly objective process, and an AI would to some degree always reflect 
the choices of the developer who programmed it.127 Humans, by contrast, are the products of 
thousands of years of evolution. AI are the immediate product of the individual developers who 
wrote their code. 
Admittedly, a mere biological requirement for intelligence would be a poor test because, 
theoretically, computers could be created from organic materials and, in fact, the preliminary 
components of such a biological computer have already been created.128 However, Abbot agrees 
that “[i]n the event that policymakers decide computers should not be inventors, a rule explicitly 
barring nonhuman inventorship would be a better way to achieve that result.”129 A bright-line rule 
distinguishing human inventorship from non-human (including AI) activities is the most durable 
approach. This approach prevents the courts from having to wade through opaque factual 
determinations of whether or not a particular AI’s algorithmic architecture constitutes a 
sufficiently equivalent “mind” on a case by case basis. 
                                                 
127 See Amir H. Khoury, Intellectual Property Rights for “Hubots”: On the Legal Implications of Human-Like 
Robots As Innovators and Creators, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 648 (2017) (“[E]ven if a certain Hubot is 
deemed to have full awareness and a “life” of its own, it still remains a machine—its seeming humanity is only a 
reflection of our own humanity and human emotions.”). Khoury imagines “Hubots” as the combination of 
autonomous intelligence and human form. Id. at 640. 
128 Abbott, supra note 28 at 1111 (citing Sebastian Anthony, Stanford Creates Biological Transistors, the Final Step 
Towards Computers Inside Living Cells, EXTREMETECH (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/152074-stanford-creates-biological-transistors-the-final-step-towards-
computers-inside-living-cells [https://perma.cc/ENX4-WZKA]). 




D. Possible Consequence of Excluding AI from Patent Inventorship 
Although excluding AI from patent inventorship is consistent with conception case law 
and the technological realities of modern AI, one possible consequence of excluding AI from 
inventorship recognition under the conception rationale can be termed the “no inventor scenario.” 
For some and possibly most modern AI, the individual or individuals who developed the AI’s 
programming can probably be recognized as the inventors of any subject matter produced through 
functioning of the AI—so long as the developers can meet the Mergenthaler standard of 
conception (i.e., the formation in their minds of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and 
operative invention). However, the concern is that, as AI become more complex—for example 
with the implementation of deep learning—developers may never know precisely what an AI’s 
algorithms are doing to reach a particular result, and the result might be subject matter far removed 
from anything the developers ever contemplated, so such developers would not be able to meet the 
Mergenthaler conception standard. If the AI cannot be listed as the inventor on a patent application 
for that subject matter, and the developers cannot be listed either, then there is no proper 
inventor.130  
Some commentators suggest that this scenario indicates that the patent system should only 
be narrowly concerned with the result of invention, not the human mental act that has traditionally 
taken place, in order to adequately encourage AI development.131 This illustrates the tension 
                                                 
130 This scenario may have even resulted as a side-effect of the UKIPO decision on the DABUS applications—the 
UKIPO chose to concede that DABUS was the creator of the inventions, but still refused to recognize DABUS as 
the inventor because DABUS was not a human, so it implied that there was no proper inventor at all. See U.K. 
Intellectual Property Office, BL O/741/19, Patent Decision for GB1816909.4 and GB1818161.0 (Dec. 4, 2019). 
131 See, e.g., Abbot supra note 28 at 1079 (“Treating nonhumans as inventors would incentivize the creation of 
intellectual property by encouraging the development of creative computers.”). Interestingly, Abbott’s article does 
not consider the alternative that developers of AI might be chilled if the AI rather than the developer were to be 
recognized as the proper inventor. 
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caused by significant industry movement toward broad implementations of AI. However, this 
result is not inconsistent with the conception framework of inventorship upon which the courts 
have relied since the nineteenth century and the policy of incentivizing human ingenuity that the 
framers cemented as the cornerstone of the U.S. patent system. Because AI are non-human by 
definition, and therefore AI can neither “conceive” of subject matter nor be incentivized to do so, 
AI are never proper inventors and any subject matter derived wholly from AI processing is 
unpatentable. 
The courts could potentially resolve this issue by carving out an exception to the 
Mergenthaler standard of conception for developers of AI, such that the developer of an AI is 
always the default inventor of any subject matter created by the AI, regardless of whether or not 
the developer has a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, but such 
a decision would be inconsistent with decades of inventorship precedent. An unprecedented 
exception like this could lead to a slippery slope of arguments ad absurdum regarding the 
inventorship status of inventors’ progeny or even their acquaintances—if an AI’s output is its 
developer’s invention in spite of conception case law to the contrary, then what about subject 
matter created by the developer’s biological children, and what about the subject matter created 
by the students the developer taught? A better solution would be to allow Congress to address the 
issue directly by statute. Congress can decide if AI are important enough for social progress that a 
unique exception in patent law should be made. Until then, only humans can be listed as inventors 
on patents. 
 
IV. RECOMMENDED OUTCOME 
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Conception is the foundational requirement for invention in the U.S. patent system. 
Furthermore, conception is the earliest discernable nexus between the act of invention and the 
economic benefits conferred by the patent system. Sooner or later, a case challenging joint 
inventorship on a patent governed by the AIA will make it to the Federal Circuit. The Federal 
Circuit should explicitly adopt the conception standard articulated in Mergenthaler as the 
requirement for proper inventorship for patent cases originating under the AIA. 
In doing so, AI should be excluded from being recognized as inventors on patent 
applications because modern AI processing is distinct from the human mental act of conception. 
Furthermore, AI processing breaks down the requisite nexus between human ingenuity and the 
economic benefits that are granted to patent holders.  In order to prevent a complete breakdown of 
the legal framework of patent inventorship, inventorship must be limited to humans. If we ever 
find ourselves in a world where an AI can supersede its programming and autonomously request 
to be listed as an inventor, we have far more pressing problems to worry about.  
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